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In accordance with the so-called secularisation thesis, social scientists in the past claimed that the role of religion in the late modern age was in decline. Nowadays, few would disagree with the statement of Peter Berger, that 'the world today … is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever' (The Desecularization of the World. Washington-Grand Rapids 1999, p. 2) . The former disinterest in religion among scholars is being replaced with a growing number of studies in sociology, political science, economics and other related fields that are drawing attention to the return or new entry of religion to the sphere of politics and the public space, which is certainly not limited to the world of (fundamentalist) Islam. The reviewed volume, written predominantly by American scholars, is concerned with religion within Europe, the role religion plays in contemporary and possible future enlargement of the EU, and the (as yet nonexistent) common European identity. In brief, they take seriously James Beckford's observation that the boundaries of 'secular' Europe are becoming sharply defined in religious terms.
Three introductory papers (by P.J. Katzenstein, D. Philpott and T.S. Shah, and J. Casanova) define the main issues studied in the book. Has modern Europe development become the model for the worldwide decline in religious significance, as claimed by the secularists, or is it rather the exception that proves the rule of de-secularisation, which is what Berger recently stated? And if the latter is the more realistic view, how it is possible that 'secularised' post-Christian Europe still has numerous implicit ties with the confessions it formerly embraced? How is the battle over the religious clause in the European constitution (which is still not approved) to be understood, or the Catholics' quest for the re-evangelisation of Europe from the East (mainly Poland), or the unwillingness of the European majority (including many politicians) to accept Muslim Turkey as a member state in the EU, which so far is a rhetorically secular club of formerly Latin Christian states (with a few Orthodox Christian exceptions)? Are Orthodox or Muslim members welcome to join the club? Or do these questions have something to do with the heavily politicised issue of immigration? However much most observers would agree with Katzenstein's presumption that 'European enlargement will feed rather than undermine the importance of religion in the EU' (p. 2), it is necessary to go further, following Casanova's argument (first published in Transit 27/2004, pp. 86-106) that it has not been religion per se but the implicitly religious 'knowledge regime' of secularism that has adopted many Latin Christian institutions, and that has defined the European self-understanding/s against the religious 'others'. The de-churching of the European population and the privatisation of religion have not resulted in total secularisation, and anti-clerical movements have not protected 'fortress Europe' from a concealed or unconscious backing of established religious traditions.
The book is divided into three main parts on Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and (Turkish) Islam, and respectively the attitudes of these religions towards the European integration process. While Catholicism can be regarded as the most trans-national of the three religious traditions, widely involved in Europeanisation from its beginnings in the 1950s, Eastern Christianity appears to be the least, owing to the nationalist character of Orthodox churches and their relation to the state. Paradoxically, recent Turkish Islam is somewhere in between, considering the fact that the Islamist Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) is attempting to enter Europe without becoming religiously Europeanised (either in the Christian or postChristian sense), and it sees European democ-605 REVIEWS racy and religious privatisation as an obstruction to Kemalist forced secularisation. However, these general findings, which are reviewed again by T. A. Byrnes in his concluding chapter (pp. 283-305), should be examined in more detail.
J. B. Hehir has pointed out, for example, that a comparison between European and American Catholics has shown that the latter are much more publicly engaged (pp. 112-115), while the European clergy rely primarily on its exposure in high politics. Similarly S. P. Ramet, offering her standard phenomenalistic take on Eastern European data, argues that the Church is certainly not homogenous in its evaluation of European integration. Poland has experienced wide religious de-privatisation since 1989, as the former Pope willed, albeit its accession did not just have strong supporters (advocating the Poles' re-evangelist efforts), but also opponents, who were worried about secularisation, widespread materialism and consumption over spiritual values, or the forced abolition of relatively new restrictive laws (e.g. on sexual behaviour). Similar polarisationthough the majority is more Europhobic -can also be seen in the Orthodox churches that emphasise the preservation of national identity and traditions against the secular, materialistic and liberal West, and against their traditional enemy -the Muslims (or even the prospect of a Muslim presence within European borders).
Not surprisingly, the biggest disagreement that can be observed among the book's authors is over Muslims. On the one hand, B. Tibi, a Muslim naturalised in Europe, argues in his 'confession' that neither shari'a Islam or Islamism as such can be integrated into a secular Europe according to the French model, and he calls for the modern privatisation of (the Muslim) faith through Euro-Islam. In his viewpoint, Europe must refrain from identifying with any particular religious ideology (including Christian). Unfortunately he pays no attention to the recent problems with implicit Christian substrate of laïcité. Precisely this issue, as well as Tibi's essentialist description of Islam and Europe (whether postChristian or not), are the targets of M.H. Yavuz's and J. Casanova's criticism. They offer a more structured analysis of the development of Turkish Islam and the changes in its relationship with a secular/post-Christian Europe and maintain that possible Turkish accession is leading to a major debate over the meaning of European identity, while (non-integrated) immigrants only make the problem more visible. Casanova also adds that however dubious the democratic attitudes of recent Islamists may seem, those espoused by Christians' (and especially Catholics) just some decades ago were not any better (p. 73). And T.A. Byrnes remarks in his conclusion that, 'as the field of [studying] International Relations moves slowly and reluctantly to take seriously the religious entities … it must do so with a very clear understanding of the diversity of religion itself, and with an equally clear recognition of the very diverse ways in which religion intersects with politics. It would be a real shame … if the field's response to transnational religion and its role in world affairs simply shifted from one of disinterest to one of oversimplification ' (p. 302) .
He is absolutely right, but his and his colleagues' book is not free of certain shortcomings of this kind. Some are connected with the fact that the contributing scholars are primarily of an American background. On the one hand, they correctly recognise the role Islam itself (both immigrant and Turkish) has in the struggle for a common European identity, which is different from the New World where Muslim immigrants constitute just one small minority among others. On the other hand, the majority of the authors (with the exception most notably of Casanova) pay attention only to organised forms of religion, those that are most visible from the political scientist's viewpoint or from the American's experience, and leave aside T. Luckmann's 'invisible religion'. Precisely this, however, is a very significant factor in European affairs, as is the existence of substitutive religions that may include the ideology of secularism. The 'great enlargement' of the EU in 2004 left aside (at least temporarily) Orthodox countries and thus contributed to creating an external image of the EU as a predominantly Latin Christian association. But it is misleading to judge CEE members based on the Polish prototype and its Roman Catholic image. Polish under-secularisation (among the EU-15 comparable only to the Irish) is much less common than the Czech and East German over-secularisation, and in the latter countries laïcité fills the role of institutional (albeit implicit) religion. Unlike France, for example, where both religion and its antipode underwent a certain 'secularisation' process in the late modern age, nowadays there is a great danger of a sharp struggle between religious organisations and their adherents on the one side and their strong opponents in Eastern European countries on the other, and not only involving (the former) Orthodox countries and their attitudes towards the EU. Similarly, it is misleading to ignore the issue of Protestantism, even though it is much less involved in European trans-national ties and less visible than the prevailingly Catholic Christian democracy and the policy of the Holy See, and there are few signals of any wider religious attendance in Protestant/Anglican countries (as the authors argue on pp. 14, 62-63). The secularism of the Protestant countries has in many ways remained superficial. It has led to 'believing without belonging' and the 'vicarious function' of (unattended) churches, as G. Davie maintains in her books. Moreover, the German 'political unification' of all Christians, or the Dutch or more recently the Scandinavian contribution to European integration process must also be taken into account.
It must also be noted that there are large discrepancies between the contributions to the volume. Some authors are re-affirmed in their position as top experts in the contemporary scientific study of religion, most notably José Casanova on both examples of 'multiple modernities' (i.e. Poland and Turkey) and on theoretical approaches to European religious development and its comparison with other parts of the world (here mainly the United States). Others provide nothing but an exact description of their fields. This is especially true for Sabrina P. Ramet, whose papers on Polish Catholicism and Balkan and post-Soviet Orthodoxy inform the reader about (usually) unfamiliar data on religion in Eastern Europe, but they do not try to go beyond that and proceed into theoretically or historically grounded analyses; And for one of the editors, Timothy A. Byrnes, who has commendably drawn the attention of political scientists to religion (not only in this volume), but who usually fails himself to present a more complex -let's say sociologicalunderstanding of religion. In the case of Eastern European religion it is not the editors' fault along for the significant lack of analysis, as they were simply unable to find the necessary contributors. The unwillingness or inability of Eastern European social scientists to contribute to international discussions is unfortunately quite widespread, and it is mainly they (i.e. we) who are responsible for this; thus Vjekoslav Perica (University of Utah), examining the Serbian Orthodox Church, was the only contributor to the volume with Eastern European roots.
I cannot say that the reviewed book has exhausted the topic of the return or new entry of religiosity into European politics. In many cases it poses the important questions, but gives no complete answers, and other areas of research are simply left aside. However, it is a significant (mostly factual and to a lesser degree theoretical) contribution to the fields of political science and sociology of religion, which for too long were (unconsciously) ruled by a secular liberalist self-understanding that paid little attention to the real and certainly not unreligious world. The same is true for most contemporary Europeans, real devotees of the teleological theory of religious decline as a result of modernisation, for whom the view from outside -that of prevailingly American scholars, or the Muslim view mediated by some contributing authors -can shed light on some deeply hidden symbols and institutions of their own identity. It is a major question to what degree contemporary Europe is still Christian or post-Christian, a question that has much to do with EU enlargement, the issue of immigration, multiculturalism, and even our own identity. Of course, the question cannot be answered in a single volume (I am even not sure it can be answered by any scholarly discussion), but the important thing is that the question is raised. Nolens volens, we have to realise that de-traditionalised post-Christian Europe may still have something in common with its former religion/s (and ipso facto something distinguishing it from others), knowledge of which is of great importance, especially for scholars in post-communist countries. Whether we ought to work on strengthening or weakening these ties, and in relation to which ideology, is a completely separate issue. Branko Milanovic is a lead economist at the World Bank who has been dealing with world inequality for three decades and is deeply involved in the topic. His most recent book is both a synthesis of his many years of research in the field and an important step forward in explaining the issue. In just 150 pages, he offers a concise clarification of the problem and in the next 50 pages he provides the reader with the results produced by various inequality measurements. Although tightly focused, the methodology is by far the book's main message. Indeed, it is a substantial one and well underpinned by geopolitical and historical considerations about what might be behind the trend or trends in inequality as variously represented using different measurements.
The book excels for its innovative substance and sound style. It is thus highly readable and accessible even for people unfamiliar with inequality issues. 'The mother of all inequality disputes is the concept of inequality', begins the author. He then distinguishes three various measures, each of which has a specific construction and use. Concept 1, the most frequently used measure of inequality, takes countries as units of observation and characterises them by GDP. Concept 2 adds population weight to the previous information, so that, for example, Luxembourg and China are not taken as units of observation on the same level. Concept 3 is quite different, as it observes all individuals or households and computes using populations of people instead of sets of countries or regions.
Understandably, different methods return different results regarding the level and, in particular, dynamics of inequality. Concept 1 (the unweighted inter-country measure) shows a trend of increasing inequality. The turning point occurred in 1978-1980, when the oil crisis caused oil prices to triple, real interest rates soared and the world growth rate slowed down. At that time, the proportion of middle-income populations declined (some countries of Latin America, Eastern Europe), while China and India pulled ahead, and Africa's position deteriorated further. Taking the poorest country in the Western 'first' world (Portugal) as a benchmark, the author distinguishes the second, third and fourth worlds, where GDP is a third, between one and two-thirds, and finally more than two-thirds below Portugal's GDP.
While the first and second 'worlds' has shrunk in recent decades in terms of the number of countries and the size of the population they encompass, the third world has expanded as a result of China's and India's
